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Introduction
International Human Rights Law, as expressed in the relevant international
human rights instruments, guarantees the right to fair trial. The United
Kingdom's domestic law recognizes the right to fair trial. Indeed, two basic
principles underpin English Criminal Law. First, an individual is innocent
until proven guilty. Implicit in this principle is that the prosecution carries
the burden of proof in establishing the guilt of the accused. Second, an
individual has the right against self-incrimination. Together these rights
and obligations underpin the right to a fair trial and are inextricably
linked; the abrogation of one right is likely to impact the other.
This article will concern itself with the curtailment of the right to
silence in the United Kingdom. While centering on the specific experience
of the Emergency Regime in Northern Ireland, the issues raised in this article have wider application. The proliferation of anti-terrorism legislation in
the wake of the events of September 11 raise serious concerns regarding
compatibility of these extraordinary measures with domestic and international human rights obligations. As this article reveals, the 'emergency
rule, normalcy exception' can shift, leaving a temporary permanence of the
emergency.
The first section of this article defines the right to silence. Section I
examines the relevancy of this right in relation to the basic principles of
f Irish Centre for Human Rights, National University of Ireland Galway; LL.M,
Queen's University Belfast; Ph.D., London School of Economics. I would like to thank
John Jackson and Joshua Castellino for their comments on an earlier version of this
article. Any remaining errors and the views expressed are the sole responsibility of the
author.
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criminal law, and provides a brief look at the American experience. 1 Section II focuses on the specific case of Northern Ireland, where the 1988
Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order ("Order") permits a court to
draw adverse inferences when an accused exercises his or her right to
silence. This section will look at history and substance, and survey the
case law interpreting the Order. Section III concerns itself with the right of
silence and international law, 2 with specific focus on relevant case law
from the European Court of Human Rights as well as the Human Rights
Committee's findings. 3 In the concluding section, the article argues that
the Order undermines fair trial principles and violates several international human rights treaties to which the United Kingdom is a signatory.4
I. What is the Right to Silence?
Two primary elements constitute the right to silence. The first, and most
basic, is that an individual should not be compelled, during pre-trial or
trial, to answer questions put before him or her. Specifically, during police
questioning in pre-trial investigations an accused may decline to answer
some or all queries, or simply may remain silent when asked about specific
pieces of information. During trial, an accused may choose to remain
silent under questioning or may refuse to testify in his or her defense. The
second component follows; the exercise of this right does not establish evi5
dence against the defendant.
An accused's right to remain silent flows from basic principles, which
have underpinned the United Kingdom's system of criminal law.6 These
1. It is important to note that while current protection of right to silence under
domestic U.S. legislation remains, anti-terrorism legislation in Canada, see Anti-Terrorism Act, ch. C-36, Part II, § 83.28(10) (2001) (Can.), and in Australia, see Security Legislation Amendment (Terrorism) Act, 2002, No. 65 (Austl.), removes this protection.
2. While this section is confined to an examination of the jurisprudence related to
international human rights instruments, note that safeguards against compulsion, and
the presumption of innocence, are also found under international humanitarian law.
See generally Geneva Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
art. 99, para. 2, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 210; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), Dec. 7, 1978, art. 75, para. 4(d) and (f), 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1424; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Dec. 7, 1978,
art. 6, para. 2(d) and (0, 16 I.L.M. 1442, 1445-46.
3. The Human Rights Committee is a body of experts charged with monitoring
implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M.
368 (1967) [hereinafter ICCPR].
4. See, e.g., id.; Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Council of Europe, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter ECHR].
5. See R v. Gilbert, 66 CRIM. App. R. 237, 244 (1977) ("It is our opinion now clearly
established by the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Court of Criminal Appeal
that to invite a jury to form an adverse opinion against an accused on account of his
exercise of his right to silence is a misdirection .... ").
6. These principles remain the foundation of the criminal law system in the United
States, but were effectively abrogated in Northern Ireland, see Criminal Evidence
(Northern Ireland) Order, 1988, (N. Ir. 20) [hereinafter CENI Order], and in England
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principles include the presumption of innocence until proven guilty, with
the burden of proof resting with the prosecution, and protection against
self-incrimination. The Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure ("Commission") addressed the link between the right to silence and these two
principles in a 1981 report:
In the accusatorial system of trial the prosecution sets out its case first. It is
not enough to say merely "I accuse." The prosecution must prove that the
defendant is guilty of a specific offence. If it appears that the prosecution
has failed to prove an essential element of the offence, or if its evidence has
been discredited in cross-examination, there is no case to answer and the
defence does not respond. There is no need for it to do so. To require it to
rebut unspecific and unsubstantiated allegations, to respond to a mere accusation, would reverse the onus of proof at trial, and would require the defendant to prove the negative, that he is not guilty. Accordingly, "it is the duty
of the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt," which is,
in Lord Sankey's
7
words, the "golden thread" running through English criminal justice.
In addressing the accused's right to silence as a protection against selfincrimination, the Commission stated:
The second element in the right of silence is that no one should be compelled to betray himself. It is not only that those extreme means of attempting to extort confessions, for example the rack and thumbscrew, which have
sometimes disfigured the system of criminal justice in this country, are
abhorrent to any civilised society, but that they and other less awful, though
not necessarily less potent, means of applying pressure to an accused person
to speak do not necessarily produce speech or the truth. This is reflected in
the rule that statements by the accused to be admissible must have been
8
made voluntarily ....
When a state rescinds a defendant's right to silence, these two essential
principles-the presumption of innocence and the right against self-incrimination-are abrogated. If a state requires an accused to testify or draws
negative inferences when the accused invokes the right to silence, the burden of proof (which international standards lie squarely with the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt) is shifted from the
prosecution to the defendant. The ability of the fact-finder to draw adverse
inferences from an accused's exercise of the right to silence lowers the
prosecution's burden of proof needed to establish guilt. Theoretically, the
prosecution must still establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. However,
in practice, the prosecution's burden is made easier. 9 The fact-finder can
consider adverse inferences alongside evidence, which alone may establish
and Wales, see Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, ch. 33 (Eng.), §§ 34-39
[hereinafter CJPO].
7. ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REPORT, 1981, Cmnd. 8092, at 80,
para. 4.35 Ihereinafter RoYAL COMMISSION].
8.

Id. at 80-81, para. 4.36.

9. See John D. Jackson, Silence and Proof: Extending the Boundaries of Criminal Procedure in the United Kingdom, 5 INT'LJ. EvIDENCE & PROOF 145, 152-157 (2001) thereinafter Jackson, Silence and Proof].
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guilt. This may enable the fact-finder to arrive at a guilty verdict on the
basis of otherwise insufficient evidence.
Concomitantly, a system that permits compulsion is inconsistent with
the right against self-incrimination. There is little doubt that permitting
adverse inferences, drawn from an individual's exercise of his or her right
to silence, is a method of compulsion. It allows law enforcement officials
"undue advantage of the situation of a detained or imprisoned person for
the purpose of compelling him to confess, to otherwise to incriminate himself, or to force him to testify against another person ....
10 In such a
system, the presumption shifts from innocence to guilt. Under this system,
the accused must decide whether to remain silent, thereby subjecting oneself to adverse inferences, or to testify, which may amount to selfincrimination.
The privilege against self-incrimination served as the basis for the
landmark 1966 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Miranda v. Arizona,"
which affirmed an individual's right to remain silent in both pre-trial and
trial stages of a criminal procedure. In Miranda, the Court held that protection against self-incrimination has been "long recognized and applied in
other settings.' 2 The Miranda Court upheld two basic constitutional
rights first laid out in Escobedo v. Illinois:13 "'No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,' and that, 'the
accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel.""' 4 Chief Justice Warren's majority opinion held that in the pre-trial 'custodial interrogation'
procedure:
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This
atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not
physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of human dignity. The
current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our
Nation's most cherished principles - that the individual may not be compelled to incriminate himself. Unless adequate protective devices are
employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no
statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of free
choice. 15
The Court held that an individual must, prior to interrogation, "be
informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain
silent,"1 6 and "that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court."' 7 The Court continued, the individual "must be clearly
10. Concluding Document of the Moscow Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1991, at 23. This
document was signed by the United Kingdom.
11. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12. Id. at 442.
13. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
14. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442, quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V and VI.
15. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58 (making a clear reference to individual's constitutional right to counsel).
16. Id. at 467-68.
17. Id. at 469.
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informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have his
lawyer with him during interrogation."' 18 Moreover, "if he is indigent, a
lawyer will be appointed to represent him." 19 If a statement is made without the presence of an attorney, the 'burden' rests with the Government to
demonstrate that this statement was made of his or her free will. 20

Fur-

thermore, the Court held that if an individual provides partial answers or
explanations, he or she has not waived the right to silence and may still
invoke the right at any future point.2 1 Mirandaclearly states that the right
to remain silent is protected throughout the pre-trial and trial phases of a
22
criminal investigation.
The American experience, while comprehensive, is not unique. In
Herbert v. The Queen,23 the Supreme Court of Canada held that Section 7
of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms includes the right to
silence. 2 4 Provisions protecting the right to silence can also be found in
various European jurisdictions. Both the Dutch and German Procedure
Codes have provisions allowing the accused to exercise the right to silence
without adverse inference. Furthermore, even though it is not codified, the
25
right to silence has been protected in Belgian Courts.
In contradistinction to these experiences, operative legislation in
Northern Ireland, England, and Wales 26 does not protect the right to
silence in either the pre-trial or trial stage. 27 Note the caution the Order
gives to an accused in circumstances delineated under Article 3 of the
Order:
You do not have to say anything unless you wish to do so but I must warn
you that if you fail to mention any fact which you rely on in your defense in
court, your failure to take this opportunity to mention it may be treated in
18. Id. at 471.
19. Id. at 473.
20. See id. at 475.
21.

Id. at 475-76.

22. See id. at 467.
23. [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151.

24. Id. at 186 (describing the right as the "essence of the right to silence is that the
suspect be given a choice; the right is quite simply the freedom to choose - the freedom
to speak to the authorities on the one hand, and the freedom to refuse to make a statement to them on the other.").
25. Under Article 29 of the Dutch Criminal Procedure Code:
[1In all cases in which a suspect is interrogated, the questioning judge or official
should refrain from any act aimed at provoking a statement, of which it cannot
be said that it was freely given. The suspect is not required to answer. Before
the interrogation, the suspect is informed that he/she is not required to answer.
For similar protection in Germany, see German Criminal Procedure Code, § 243, para.
4, StGB, reprinted in English in THE GERMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 119 (Dr. Horst
Niebler trans., Sweet & Maxwell Ltd. 1965) (Vol. 10 of The American Series of Foreign
Penal Codes).
26. For examination of the relevant legislation in England and Wales, see CJPO,
supra note 6, para. 34-39.
27. Note that until 1996, when amendments to the Code of Practice were issued, the
Order permitted, inter alia, silence to be corroborative of other evidence against an
accused. To review how the CENI Order treats an accused's silence, see, for example,
CENI Order, supra note 6, arts. 3, 4, and 5.
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court as supporting any relevant evidence against you.
If you do wish to say
28
anything, what you say may be given in evidence.
However, the British government maintains that "[t]he legislation does
not alter the burden resting on the prosecution to prove the case against the
accused beyond a reasonable doubt or in any way affect the presumption of
innocence." 2 9 Nonetheless, as one commentator noted, this legislation and
subsequent legislation in England and Wales, "was neither a fair nor an
effective means of bringing terrorist offenders to justice . . .[with studies
raising] doubts about the fairness and effectiveness of drawing inferences
from silence under the interview regime which exists for both terrorist and
ordinary suspects in Northern Ireland and England." 30 The government
has maintained that during police interviews, measures "including tape
recording, access to outside contact and to legal advice at public expense"
continue to safeguard subjects deemed vulnerable. 3 1 However, suspects
32
detained under emergency legislation may not receive such safeguards.
Under the Terrorism Act 2000, investigators may detain a suspect for
up to forty-eight hours without charge, and extend the initial period of
detention up to seven days. 33 Under the accompanying Code of Practice,
an investigator may interrogate a suspect without the presence of legal
counsel for up to forty-eight hours. 34 Until legislation was amended in
1999, a court or jury could deduce adverse inferences even when the
accused was denied access to legal advice. In 1999, silence legislation
changed in Northern Ireland, England, and Wales to prevent a court or
jury from drawing adverse inferences, unless the accused had access to
legal advice during questioning in a police station or "other authorized

28. Murray v. U.K., 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, 31 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1996) (quoting an example of a police cautioning under Article 3 of the Order).
29. Fourth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 1994: Addendum. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1994, para. 324, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/
Add.3 (1994) [hereinafter Fourth Periodic Reports].
30. Jackson, Silence and Proof, supra note 9, at 147; see also, John Jackson et al.,
Legislating Against Silence: The Northern Ireland Experience, 1 NIO Research and Statistical Series (2000) [hereinafter Jackson, Legislating Against Silence].
31. See Fourth Periodic Reports, supra note 29, para. 325.
32. This remains in cases where suspects are questioned outside of a police station.
See infra Section II.
33. Terrorism Act, 2000 c. 11, (Eng.), § 41(3) and sched. 8, Part 11, para. 29(3)
[hereinafter Terrorism Act 2000].
34. See Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 32 (denying accused access to a solicitor for a
period of forty-eight hours); see also Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act,
1996, c. 24, § 47 (Eng.) [hereinafter EPA] (granting to a person detained and held in
police custody under the terrorism provisions of this Act the right to consult a solicitor
privately); Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1989, c. 4, § 14(4)
(Eng.) (providing that a suspect could be held for up to forty-eight hours without charge,
and the initial period of detention extended for up to seven days); id. § 14(5) (allowing
the initial forty-eight hour period to be extended, for no longer than five days with written notice to defendant).
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place of detention. '3 5 However, even with this additional protection, several questions remain "about the fairness of the procedural environment in
those cases where, for whatever reason, the suspect has not chosen to avail
himself or herself of the legal advice offered."'3 6 Additionally, as discussed
below, the 1999 amended provisions seem to fall short of the European
Court's requirement, set forth in Murray v. United Kingdom. It is clear that
the 'emergency rule, normalcy exception,' increasingly found in instances
of protracted conflicts, such as has existed in Northern Ireland, has a
profound and indelible impact on the criminal justice apparatus, thereby
creating a temporary permanence of the emergency. The erosion of the
guarantee to the right to silence, which spilled over from Northern Ireland
to England and Wales, is only one symptom in an ever-increasing trend
toward domestic absorption of emergency legislation.
II.

The Right to Silence and the United Kingdom

The right to silence was not curtailed in Northern Ireland until 1988.
Nonetheless, intense debate on the issue can be found as early as 1972,
when the Criminal Law Revision Committee ("CLRC") recommended
amendments to the law that would allow a judge or jury to draw adverse
inferences if an accused exercised his or her right of silence in the pre-trial
stage.3 7 Specifically, the CLRC recommended that if, during a police interrogation, an accused failed to mention a fact, which he or she later relied
upon in court, the fact-finder could draw adverse inferences from the
accused's failure to mention said facts. Furthermore, the CLRC suggested
that an accused be cautioned that his or her failure to disclose such a fact
would impact the credibility of their defense, and thus have a negative
effect on the case.
In 1981, the Commission rejected the CLRC's recommendations,
along with other calls to abolish or limit the right to silence. 3 8 Despite the
Commission's findings, the then Home Secretary, Douglas Hurd, reopened
the debate on the right to silence in July 1987. 39 In May of 1988, Mr.
Hurd, in a written reply in the House of Commons, stated:
I am not convinced that the protection which the law now gives to the
accused person who ambushes the prosecution can be justified. The case
for change is strong. But I am persuaded by some of the comments which
have been made that more careful work needs to be done before we can bring
forward with confidence a specific proposal for legislation ....40
35. Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999, c. 23, § 58 (Eng.); CENI Order,
supra note 6, art. 3(6); Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1999 (SI 1999 No.
2789), art. 36.
36. Jackson, Silence and Proof, supra note 9, at 150.
37. See generally CRIMINAL LAw REVISION COMMITTEE: EVIDENCE (GENERAL), ELEVENTH
REPORT, 1972, Cmnd. 4991, at 16-34.
38. ROYAL COMMISSION, supra note 7, at 87, para. 4.53.
39. See REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON THE RIGHT OF SILENCE, 1989, Div. C4
(Home Office London), at 4.
40. Id. at 5.
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That same month, Mr. Hurd set up a Working Group on the Right to
Silence ("Working Group") whose remit was to examine, with the aim of
recommending amendment or abrogation, the right to silence. In advance
of the Working Group's deadline for submission of views, the Government
introduced to Parliament a draft Order, curtailing the right to silence in
Northern Ireland. 4 1 The Order could not be amended. As justification,
the Government used an argument similar to Lord Colville's argument,
which he raised the previous year in his review of the PTA. 4 2 The Government argued that due to the emergency situation in Northern Ireland, and
the particular problems posed by 'terrorists,' it was necessary to expedite
the procedure. 43 The Government passed the Order through an extraordinary procedure called Order in Council. 4 4 After a short debate in the
House of Commons, the House of Lords approved the Order in November
of 1988 and it came into effect in December of 1988.
Under the Order, the fact-finder can draw an inference of guilt if a
defendant chooses to remain silent. An adverse inference may be drawn
from pre-trial silence in three situations, and from silence during the trial
in one situation. Thus, the accused can either provide potentially selfincriminating information, or remain silent, which can be inferred as an
admission of guilt.
Article 3 of the Order permits adverse inferences when a defendant
bases his or her criminal defense on a fact which he or she failed to disclose during police questioning, but which the defendant could reasonably 45 have been expected to mention when questioned. 4 6 The trial court
determines ex post facto what constitutes an unreasonable failure to dis41. See generally id. While the Working Group submitted five primary recommendations for reform, similar to those submitted earlier by the CLRC in 1972, they were less
extensive than the changes made by the legislation; see also John Jackson, Recent Developments in Northern Ireland, inTHE RIGHT TO SILENCE DEBATE: PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE HELD AT THE UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL ON 27 MARCH 1990 44, 46-48 (Steven Greer &

Rod Morgan eds., 1990).

42. REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF THE PREVENTION OF TERRORISM (TEMPORARY PROVISIONS) ACT 1984, 1987, Cm. 264 [hereinafter the Colville Report]. Lord Colville states
that the proper procedures instituted to protect both detainees and police from abuse
"solve nothing if the detainee is trained to say nothing." Id. at 13. He went on,
"[t]errorist training manuals now contain detailed techniques whereby a person under
interrogation may devote his mind to something which enables him to resist the temptation to answer even the most innocent sounding question." Id.
43. CRIMINAL EVIDENCE (NORTHERN IRELAND), 1988, 140 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.)
(1988) 184. In the short debate that followed on the Order, the then Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland, Tom King, noted that this legislation was necessary to deal with
what he described as a "sustained and systemic assault on the rule of law" faced by
police when interrogating those suspected of terrorist offences. Id. at 185.
44. An Order in Council is a command or a decision taken by the Privy Council.
45. There is some judicial direction regarding the notion of 'reasonableness' deriving
from, what has come to be known as, the Wednesbury principle. See Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corp. 1 K.B. 223 (Eng. C.A. 1948) (defining the
term unreasonable as, "a general description of the things that must not be done ...
something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the
powers of the [acting] authority." Id. at 229.).
46. CENI Order, supra note 6, art. 3.

2002

Emergency Rule, Normalcy Exception

close a fact. Article 3 applies before and after an accused has been charged
or informed of prosecution proceedings. The Order does not expressly
require the accused have access to legal counsel or advice. However, as
previously detailed, subsequent legislation does not allow a court or jury
to draw adverse inferences where a defendant has been denied access to
47
legal counsel.
Article 3 does not expressly require investigators to inform a defendant of the potential consequence of his or her silence. 4 8 However, the
Secretary of State issued guidance requiring that law enforcement officials
warn defendants of the consequences of remaining silent in Article 3 situations. 4 9 This 'guidance,' incorporated under a Code of Practice issued pursuant to the PACE Order, requires police to inform individuals of the
potential adverse effects of refusal to answer questions. This rule is as if a
failure to respond after receiving a Mirandawarning from a police officer in
the United States would be admissible evidence of guilt. 50 However, the
guidelines detailing when to administer this caution are broad. For
instance, the law enforcement official may administer the caution informing the accused of the charges or the evidence against him or her, and
51
before the accused has a chance to consult with an attorney.
Article 5 of the Order permits adverse inferences when a defendant
fails to give the police an explanation for forensic evidence found on or
near his or her person that could reasonably be believed to result from the
defendant's participation in a crime. 52 Under Article 6, a defendant risks
adverse inferences by failing to account for his or her whereabouts at the
time a crime was committed. 53 Finally, Article 4 permits the fact-finder to
draw adverse inferences from the defendant's refusal to answer questions
54
at trial.
Article 2 of the Order specifies that adverse inferences, drawn from an
accused's exercise of the right to silence in Article 3-6 circumstances, can
55
supplement, but not serve as the foundation of the prosecution's case.
Ostensibly, this requirement appears reasonable. However, the Order
grants the fact-finder wide discretion and provides little guidance as to
when inferences can be drawn. The Order states only that inferences
should be drawn "as appear proper."5 6 As the following review of the case
law suggests, since the enactment of the Order, the scope permitting the
47. But see Jackson, Legislating Against Silence, supra note 30 (discussing that one
caveat to this exists when a suspect is questioned outside of a police station).
48. Other provisions of the Order have specific requirements giving defendant caution of the consequences of his or her silence. See, e.g., CENI Order, supra note 6, art.
4(2), 5(5), and 6(3).
49. See supra Section II.
50. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-79.
51. Terrorism Act, supra note 33, § 7, para. 109.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

CENI Order, supra note 6, art. 5.
Id. art. 6.
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 2(4).
Id. art. 3(2)(i), 4(4)(a), 5(2)(b)(i), and 6(2)(b)(i).
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drawing of adverse inferences from an accused's exercise of a right to
silence has gradually expanded.
The initial reaction of Diplock Court 57 judges in Northern Ireland was
to apply the Order with restraint. In R v. Smith, one of the first test cases
for application of the Order, it appeared that the Court was willing to apply
the Order with a view to strict implementation of Article 2.58 In this case
Lord Justice Kelly held that a fact-finder should draw adverse inferences
under the Order only where the other evidence approaches the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard; what has been since termed the 'on the brink
of the necessary standard of proof criterion. 59 The judgment stated:
It seems to me that in some cases the failure of an accused to give evidence
may justify a finding of guilt where the weight of the prosecution evidence
just rests on the brink of the necessary standard of proof. In other cases the

failure to give evidence may merely heighten suspicion. For it is nothing
novel to say that courts have long recognised that there may be many reasons, innocent as well as sinister, for the refusal of an accused to give
evidence. 60
In this particular case, forensic and identification evidence presented
linked the accused to the crime of murder. However, the trial judge did not
feel the evidence, as presented, was sufficient and the trial ended with an
61
acquittal.
In the wake of Smith, it appeared that judges were prepared to only
apply the Order in specified circumstances. In R v. Gamble, for example,
the judge factored the accused's exercise of silence when questioning a previously stated defense claim, but did not apply an adverse inference to
strengthen the prosecution's case. 62 This case involved a fatal paramilitary
punishment shooting. 63 The defendants were members of the proscribed
loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force ("UVF"). 64 In pre-trial questioning, one of
the accused, Douglas, made a statement indicating that he had transported
three men who he thought would inflict bodily harm on the victim. 6 5 He
stated that he heard one of the three men threaten the victim with a knee57. See The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1973, ch. 53 (Eng.) [hereinafter the EPA]. Following a review by a government commission led by Lord Diplock
in 1972, a series of recommendations was made culminating in the Northern Ireland
(Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA); an infrastructure of 'emergency' began. Many of the
provisions of the repealed Special Powers Act were resurrected in the EPA. Under this
legislation a system of trial without jury, commonly known as the Diplock Courts, was
established. Id. § 2.
58. See R v. Smith, Transcript, (N. Ir. C.A. (Kelly, J.) Oct. 20th, 1989) (LEXIS Northern Ireland Reported and Unreported Cases) (6 page un-paginated LEXIS printout)
[hereinafter Smith Transcript].
59. Id. at 5 of 6.
60. Id. (emphasis added).
61. Id.
62. See R v. Gamble & Others, Unreported Judgment, (Belfast Crown Court, Oct.
27th, 1989, (Carswell, J.)) (LEXIS, Northern Ireland Reported and Unreported Cases)
(15 page un-paginated LEXIS printout) [hereinafter Gamble Judgment].
63. Id. at 2 of 15.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 5 of 15.
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capping, but added that he did not take the threat seriously. 66
Douglas refused to testify and remained silent during trial. 6 7 Lord Justice Carswell held that Douglas was guilty of inflicting grievous bodily
harm on another, but was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant had considered killing the victim. 68

In factoring Douglas'

silence during trial, the judge specifically limited the adverse inference to
discount the exculpatory part of his admission, and did not extend the
adverse inference to give weight to the prosecution's case.
For present purposes I think it sufficient to say that where the extent of the
knowledge of an accused may be ambiguous or uncertain on the wording of
the admissions made by him, the court may be entitled to draw an adverse
inference about the true extent of that knowledge in consequence of his
refusal to give evidence ....
I consider that when Douglas refused to give
evidence ... the court is entitled to discount the exculpatory part of these
69
remarks.
The first case to mark a notable shift in the application of the Order
came in R v. Kane & Others.70 The details of this case are as follows: in
March of 1990 (in what is commonly referred to as the Casement Park

trial) Kane, Timmons, and Kelly were convicted of the murders of Corporals Wood and Howes, and of two counts of false imprisonment and grievous bodily harm. 7 1 At no time did the court accuse Kelly, Kane, or
Timmons of shooting either of the soldiers. 7 2 In fact, it is agreed the
accused were not in the vicinity where the shootings occurred. 7 3 Instead,
it appeared that in convicting these individuals, the court relied solely
upon the doctrine of common purpose.7 4 Under this doctrine, the accused
were convicted of murder on the grounds that they had participated in an

agreed upon illegal-joint-enterprise from which murder was a foreseeable

result (even though they were not present when the murder actually took
place). 7 5 While this case raises a number of fair trial issues, 7 6 this discus-

66. Id. at 5-6 of 15.
67. Id. at 6 of 15.
68. Id. at 7-8 of 15.
69. Id. at 8 of 15.
70. R v. Kane & Others, Unreported Judgment, (Belfast Crown Court Mar. 30th,
1990, (Carswell, J.)) (LEXIS, Northern Ireland Reported and Unreported Cases) (24
page un-paginated LEXIS printout) (hereinafter Kane Trial Judgment). Sean Kelly and
Michael Timmons were co-defendants in this case. Id. at 1 of 24.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 4 of 24.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 4-6 of 24.
75. Id. at 6 of 24.
76. This was especially at issue in the custodial interrogation of Patrick Kane whose
conviction was later overturned. For a detailed critique of this case, see AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT, NORTHERN IRELAND: FAIR TRIALS IN CASEMENT PARK

TRIALS (1993); see also review of case commission by the Committee on the Administration ofJustice [hereinafter CAJ], undertaken by Peter Thorton QC, (31 May 1996) (unreported, on file in CAJ offices).
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sion is limited to the Court's approach to one of the accused-Sean Kelly. 77
On the day ofhis arrest, police interviewed Sean Kelly seven times. 78
Kelly initially remained silent, but under caution gave a brief statement
indicating he attended the funeral, witnessed the car being attacked, and
saw a man brought into Casement Park. 79 After witnessing these events,
Kelly stated that he rejoined the funeral procession. 80 Kelly, under advice
of his attorney, remained silent during the trial. 8 1
A television crew's video recording and a British Army's helicopter
"heli-teli" footage provided a significant portion of the prosecution's case
against Kelly. 8 2 Judge Carswell acknowledged the poor quality of film
83
made it difficult to clearly identify Sean Kelly in the video recordings.
However, he believed that in total, the facts established Kelly as one of the
members of the Casement Park group. 84 Moreover, in convicting Kelly of
murder, Carswell held that pursuant to Article 4 of the Order, the court
was allowed to "draw such inferences as appear proper" from Kelly's
85
refusal to testify at trial.
In my opinion, the Court is entitled to place together and consider in sum
the evidence of the film taken outside Casement Park up to the point when
the soldiers were taken inside, the film taken when the taxi was leaving, the
heli-teli film of events inside Casement Park, the falsity of Kelly's statement
and his refusal to give evidence. When that is done, I am satisfied that Kelly
not only took part in bringing Corporal Wood to the gates of Casement Park,
86
but took part as an active participant in the events that occurred inside.
Clearly, the evidence presented did not satisfy the "on the brink of proof"
standard established in Smith. That is, it did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Kelly was an "active participant" in the events that led
to the deaths of the two soldiers. The judge gave Kelly's silence weight and
strengthened the prosecution's case. In so doing, the court, under Article
4, lowered the prosecution's burden of proof. Kelly was convicted of murder, despite the fact he clearly did not participate in the final phase of the
killings.8 7 It is also worth noting, Kelly remained silent during his trial on
the advice of his solicitor. 88
77. Kane Trial Judgment, (Belfast Crown Court Mar. 30th, 1990, (Carswell, J.)), at
17-20 of 24.
78. Id. at 17 of 24.
79. Id. at 17-18 of 24.
80. Id. at 18 of 24.
81. See id. at 18 of 24.
82. Id. at 18-19 of 24.
83. Id. at 19 of 24.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 19-20 of 24 (applying the doctrine of common purpose to find Kelly guilty
of murder).
88. Id. at 18 of 24. A decision based, in part, on the experience of Patrick Kane
during questioning at the trial. Kelly appealed the conviction but the Court of Appeal
upheld the lower court's findings. In their deliberation, the Court of Appeal concluded
that Kelly was clearly identifiable through the 'heli-teli' video and therefore, they did not
need to weigh his refusal to testify. See R v. Kane & Others, Transcript, (N. Ir. C.A., July
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Just over one year after Smith, the court in R v. McLernon continued to
relax its application of the Order. 8 9 This case involved a defendant charged
with possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life. 90 The defendant
remained silent for six days, but gave a partial account on the seventh
day. 9 1 This was the first case in which an adverse inference was drawn
from both an exercise of pre-trial silence under Article 3, and silence during trial under Article 4.92 In McLernon, the court held a refusal to answer
questions, "may well in itself, with nothing more, increase the weight of a
''9 3
prima facie case to the weight of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judge Kelly's decision argued, in contradistinction to subsequent interpretation, that Smith was never intended to limit the application of the Order
when introducing the "on the brink of the necessary standard of proof'
guideline. 9 4 Yet, McLernon did indeed weaken the standard of proof criterion that Smith introduced.
That Article 4 is in the widest terms. It imposes no limitation as to when it
may be invoked or what result will follow if it is invoked. Once the court has
complied with the preliminaries in Article 4(2) and called upon the accused
to give evidence and a refusal is made the court has then a complete discretion as to whether inferences should be drawn or not....
In Raymond Smith I gave such instances in broad and general terms as what
may be the consequences of the application of Article 4. But I add to these
another instance only to show the width of the parameters of Article 4; that

is, that in certain cases a refusal to give evidence under the Article may well in
itself, with nothing more, increase the9 5weight of a primafacie case to the weight
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Judge Kelly, in arguing against providing guidelines for the Order's application, stated that "[i]t would be improper and indeed quite unwise for any
court to set out bounds of" whether to "decide to draw inferences or not" in
an individual case, and the "nature, extent and degree of adversity," if it
96
decides to draw inferences.
McLernon introduced a trend which commentators have termed the
Court's 'commonsense' approach of the application of the Order. This
approach was delineated in R v. KS Murray.9 7 At trial, the defendant Kevin
Murray, was convicted of attempted murder of a part-time member of the
Ulster Defence Regiment ("UDR").

98

While his house was being searched,

5th, 1991, Kelly, J.) (LEXIS, Northern Ireland Reported and Unreported Cases) (18 page
un-paginated LEXIS printout), at 14-16 of 18 [hereinafter Kane Appellate Transcript].
89. See R v. McLernon & Others, Transcript, (Belfast Crown Court, Dec. 20, 1990,
Kelly, J.) (LEXIS, Northern Ireland Reported and Unreported Cases) (7 page unpaginated LEXIS printout) [hereinafter McLernon Transcript].
90. Id. at 1 of 7.
91. Id. at 3-4 of 7.
92. Id. at 3, 6 of 7.
93. Id. at 6 of 7 (emphasis added).
94. Id.
95. Id.(alluding to Smith Transcript, supra note 58) (emphasis added).
96. Id.
97. See R v. KS Murray, 1993 N. Ir. L.R. 105 (C.A. (Hutton, J.) 1991).
98. Id. at 107.
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Murray made a short statement in which he told police he had been at a
friend's house at the time of the murder. 99 Murray further explained that
the mud on jeans found in his possession resulted from a hunting trip that
had occurred two days before. [00 Murray made no further statements after

his arrest, and remained silent during his trial. 1 1 Judge Kelly not only
drew adverse inferences from Murray's failure to give testimony, but also
signaled that silence equaled guilt.
In the instant case it seems to be [sic] that what the prosecution has proved
in evidence calls for evidence from the accused in the witness box .... It is
only commonsense ... to infer as proper inference that he is0not
prepared to
2
assert his innocence on oath because that is not the case.
Murray's appeal focused his defense on the application and interpretation of Articles 3 and 4 of the Order. 10 3 Murray argued Article 4 of the
Order was only "declaratory of the common law," and therefore, did not
change the "scope of the inferences which can be drawn at common
law."' 1 4 Therefore, Article 4 allowed for adverse inference to be drawn
from silence only when the prosecution's evidence was sufficiently strong,
such that the accused's exercise of silence amounted to "a 'confession and
avoidance' situation at common law."' 1 5 The Court of Appeal rejected this
10 6
argument, however, and stated the Order had changed the common law.
The court held, in contradistinction to Smith, evidence produced need not
"be 'on the brink' of proving guilt."'1 7 Additionally, unlike common law,
the evidence did not have to amount to "a 'confession and avoidance" situation."t 0 8 Rather, the court argued, it was sufficient that a prima facie case
was established.
Under art 4 it would be improper for the court to draw the bare inference
that because the accused refused to give evidence in his own defence he was
therefore guilty. But where commonsense permits it, it is proper in an appropriate case for the court to draw the inference from the refusal of the
accused to give evidence that there is no reasonable possibility of an innocent explanation to rebut the prima facie case established by the evidence
adduced by the Crown, and for the drawing of this inference to lead on to
the conclusion, after all the evidence in the case has been considered, that
the accused is guilty. [09
99. Id. at 112-13.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 113-15.
102. Id. at 149, quoting R v. KS Murray, Transcript, (Belfast Crown Court, Jan. 18,
1991, Kelly, J.) (LEXIS, Northern Ireland Reported and Unreported Cases) (20 page unpaginated LEXIS printout), at 11 of 20.
103. See id. at 134.
104. Id..
105. Id.
106. Id. at 141-147 (stating: "Accordingly, we are satisfied that art 4 has changed the
law and is not merely declaratory of it.").
107. Id. at 148.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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In November 1991, the Court of Appeal referred the case to the House
of Lords. In October 1992, the House of Lords held that Article 4 of the
Order empowers a judge in a bench trial to draw adverse inferences from a
defendant's silence at trial if the prosecution has made out a prima facie
case. 1 10 A prima facie case exists when "aspects of the evidence taken
alone or in combination with other facts clearly call for an explanation
which the accused ought to be in a position to give . . . "" That same
year, in R v. Morrison & Others, the Court of Appeal held the Order permitted adverse inferences, even where the defendant explained that he refused
to answer police questions on principle to protest inequities in the adminis1 12
tration of justice.
111.

Under International Law

The relevant international human rights instruments which provide fair
1 13
trial guarantees include the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
14
("UDHR"), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights"
("ICCPR"), and the European Convention on Human Rights 1 5 ("ECHR").
To what extent is the Order compatible with the fair trial provisions found
in these human rights instruments?
A.

Burden of Proof: Innocent until proven guilty

In the primary human rights instruments, an accused is innocent until
proven guilty, with the burden of proof falling on the State. The relevant
sections are as follows:
Article 11.1 of the UDHR:
Everyone charged with a penal offence has the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law 1 1 6 in a public
trial at which he has
1 17
had all the guarantees necessary for his defence.
Article 14.2 of the ICCPR:
110. See Murray v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, 99 Crim. App. R. 396, 405 (H.L. 1994)
(appeal taken from N. Ir.), also available at 1994 WL 1061736.
111. Id.
112. See R v. Martin & Others, Transcript, (N. Ir. C.A., July 7, 1992, Kelly, J.) (LEXIS,
Northern Ireland Reported and Unreported Cases) (49 page un-paginated LEXIS
printout), at 41 of 49.
113. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
114. ICCPR, supra note 3.
115. ECHR, supra note 4.
116. The question may logically follow, according to what "law"? The answer, it
seems, is according to national law. The challenge for relevant enforcing international
mechanisms is to look at the compatibility of the relevant national law with the respective international human rights instruments. While the ECHR has indicated its role is
not to test the compatibility of national law with the Covenant, it has shown a willingness to challenge the compatibility of a national law through the specifics of individual
cases. See, e.g., Murray v. United Kingdom 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 29, 75.
117. UDHR, supra note 113, art. 11.1.
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Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall have the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to the law.' 1 8
Article 6.2 of the ECHR
Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until
proved guilty according to law. 1 19
As we have discussed, under the Order the court may draw adverse inferences from an accused's silence. Is it possible to argue that drawing such
an inference is incompatible with these international fair trial obligations?
A review of the supervising mechanisms for these instruments provides
some direction. In General Comment on Article 14, the Human Rights
Committee, the body responsible for oversight and implementation of the
ICCPR, stated:
By reason of the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof of the
charge is on the prosecution and the accused has the benefit of doubt. No
guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Further the presumption of innocence implies a right to be treated in
accordance with this principle. It is, therefore, a duty for all public authorities
120

to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial.

In Barbera v. Spain 12 1 the European Court for Human Rights held that
underpinning the presumption of innocence was the requirement "inter
alia, that when carrying out their duties, the members of a court should
not start with the preconceived idea that the accused has committed the
offence charged; the burden of proof is on the prosecution, and any doubt
1 22
should benefit the accused."'
In Murray, the government denied the applicant access to a solicitor
for the first forty-eight hours of the applicant's detention, pursuant to the
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987.123 Murray was cautioned under the Order and interviewed on twelve different occasions. 124
He remained silent throughout this period. 125 At trial, he refused to testify. 126 The trial judge, using the discretionary powers afforded under the
Order, drew adverse inferences from Murray's silence. 12 7 The court found
the denial of access to a solicitor, coupled with the power under the Order
to draw adverse inferences from silence, constituted a violation of fair trial
provisions enumerated under Article 6 of the Convention. 128 Under the
118. ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 14.2.
119. ECHR, supra note 4, art. 6.2.
120. Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, Human Rights Committee, 21st Sess., General cmt. 13, Article 14, para. 7, U.N. Doc. HR1/Gen/1/Rev.1 (1994).
121. See 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 360 (1988).
122. Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
123. Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 32.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 32-33.
126. Id. at 34.
127. Id. at 35.
128. Id. at 48. Under the emergency powers operating in Northern Ireland, individuals can be detained for up to seven days without arraignment, can be denied access to
legal counsel for up to the first 48 hours and can be further denied access for 48-hour
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particular circumstances outlined in Murray,129 the drawing of adverse
inferences did not amount to a violation under either Articles 6(1) or 6(2).
However, it is worth examining the Court's general comments relating to
the right to silence.
Although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 of the Convention, there
can be no doubt that the right to remain silent under police questioning and
the privilege against self-incrimination are generally recognised international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure
under Article 6. By providing the accused with protection against improper
compulsion by the authorities these immunities contribute to avoiding miscarriages of justice and to securing the aim of Article 6.130
The reasoning in Murray strongly suggests the Court was content to accept
the Court of Appeal's conclusion that evidence against Murray
"[c]onstitute[d] a 'formidable' case against him." 13 1 The Court then
focused solely upon "the role played by the inferences in the proceedings
against the applicant and especially in his conviction."1 3 2 This suggests
that in cases where the burden of proof for establishing guilt is lowered,
and where greater weight is placed on adverse inferences, the Court will
probably find augmented roles of adverse inferences incompatible with
Article 6. Indeed, some dissenting members of the Court clearly challenge
the compatibility of the Order with ECHR fair trial provisions. "To rely
upon it afterwards appears to me to negative the whole intent of Article
6(2). To permit such a procedure is to permit a penalty to be imposed by a
criminal court on an accused because he relies upon a procedural right
1 33
guaranteed by the Convention."
Following Murray, two cases allowed the European Court to consider
the limits of drawing adverse inferences under Article 6. The first, Condron
134
v. United Kingdom, involved drawing adverse inferences in a jury trial.
This case involved two heroin addicts who, on the advice of their attorney
who believed they were unfit for questioning, refused to answer police
intervals thereafter. See all sources, supra note 34. The Court in Murray v. United Kingdom ruled that this practice was incompatible with Article 6 of the Convention. Murray,
22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 48. Specifically, the Court stated: "To deny access to a lawyer for
the first 48 hours of police questioning, in a situation where the rights of the defence
may well be irretrievably prejudiced, is-whatever the justification for such denialincompatible with the rights of the accused under Article 6." Id. at 67. There is no
doubt that during periods in which detainees are held virtually incommunicado, an
atmosphere conducive to ill treatment exists.
129. The prima facie case against the defendant was strong which allowed the Court
to adopt the national court's commonsense reasoning and argue that under the circumstances of the case an expectation of an explanation by the defendant was reasonable
and, therefore, drawing adverse inferences as a result of his decision to remain silent was
not unfair. Id. at 63.
130. Id. at 60.
131. Id. at 62.
132. Id. at 61.
133. Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 75 (Walsh, J., dissenting). I disagree with Judge
Walsh's argument insofar as it suggests that conviction is sufficient with a prima facie
case.
134. [20001 CRIM. L. REV. 679 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000).
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questions.1 3 5 On appeal, the judge indicated that while the trial judge's
direction may have been inadequate, the conviction was safe in light of the
other presented evidence. 136 In its ruling, the European Court found the
judge's jury instruction had failed to reflect the balance between the right
to silence and circumstances in which adverse inference may be drawn
from silence and, therefore, was in violation of Article 6.137 Particularly,
the Court noted the judge should have indicated to the jury that if there
was a potential innocent reason for the defendants' silence during pre-trial
interviews, then no adverse inferences should be drawn. 13 8
While the Condron decision flows from Murray, it differs in a number
of regards. In Murray the issue was the defendant's denial of access to a
solicitor. However, in Condron, the Court argued that "adequate weight"
should be given to the content of the legal advice, -including the advice to
remain silent. 139 The Court noted such legal advice might hold "special
significance. 1 40 Specifically, the clients were simply unfit to answer questions posed to them. Additionally, the Court scrutinized the judge's jury
instruction on the use of adverse inferences and found it wanting. 14
In Avrill v. United Kingdom, the Court expanded on Murray by stating
there may be circumstances which require an explanation. 142 In Avrill,
police held the applicant near the scene of a double homicide. 143 Initially,
he was denied access to a solicitor during questioning. 144 He failed to
account for his whereabouts at the time of the murder, or to explain why
there were fibres and hairs found on his clothing that matched the gunman's. 145 The Court found a violation of Article 6(1) in conjunction with
Article (3)(c) in the denial of access to a solicitor, but did not find a breach
of Article 6(2) in respect to the drawing of adverse inferences. 146 The
Court held there was sufficient strength in the forensic evidence linking the
applicant to the murders to allow for adverse inferences.1 4 7
There are a number of points that emerge from Avrill. First, as mentioned, the Court made clear there are certain circumstances where a suspect may be called upon to provide an explanation. 1 48 There are
acceptable and unacceptable reasons for a suspect to remain silent. One
acceptable reason, as argued in Condron, was that a suspect remains silent
135. Id. at 679.
136. See id.

137. Id. at 679-80.
138. Id. at 679.

139. Id. at 680.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 679.
142. 12000] CRIM. L. REv. 682 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2000).

143. See id. at 682.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 682-83.
148. Id. at 683 (stating, "the presence of the incriminating fibres in his hair and clothing did call for an explanation from him, and so this is one circumstance in which the
right [to silence] gives way ....
").
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on the advice of a solicitor. However, in this case, the applicant chose to
remain silent simply for the purpose of not cooperating with police.
According to the Court, this was not a sufficient ground. 149 However, this
ruling also suggests that drawing adverse inferences from the accused's
failure to answer police questions must be limited. 150 It acknowledged justifications for provisions limiting the right to silence, such as those in
Northern Ireland and in the 1994 Criminal Justice and Order Act.
Notwithstanding these justifications, the Court considers that the extent to
which adverse inferences can be drawn from an accused's failure to respond
to police questioning must be necessarily limited. While it may no doubt be
expected in most cases that innocent persons would be willing to co-operate
with the police in explaining that they were not involved in any suspected
crime, there may be reasons why
in a specific case an innocent person
15 1
would not be prepared to do so.
A review of these Court cases clearly reveals that fair trial provisions
enumerated in both the ECHR and the ICCPR encompass the right to
silence. Judge Walsh's observations in Murray are clear and compelling: if
the Order is not meant to lower or shift the burden of proof (as the U.K.
government argues), and it remains that "the burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt always rests on the prosecution," 152 then silence cannot
lower the burden of proof, and its role in establishing guilt becomes essentially irrelevant. If, in theory, this remains the case (as has been argued),
then in practice the legislation, "has had the effect of shifting the balance of
power between prosecution and defense more in the direction of the prosecution by giving the police the authority as well as merely the power to
persuade suspects to answer police questions .... ,153 Indeed a review of
two research studies on the effect of the silence legislation in Northern
Ireland and England and Wales indicates:
Although there was no change in the formal burden of proof, prosecutors
were aware of the advantage they gained by being able to stress to the court
or jury that the defendant had provided no explanation or was refusing to
testify.
Defence lawyers, on the other hand, were in no doubt that the 1legislation
54
had put defendants at a psychological and tactical disadvantage.
B. Protection against self-incrimination
Article 14.3(g) of the ICCPR:
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality ... not to be
149. See id. ("The decision itself could be taken to suggest that merely standing on
one's right to silence may not be a sufficient justification .
150. Id.
151. Id. (COMMENTARY, quoting R v. Averill, Unreported Trial Transcript, reprinted in
para. 47).
152. Murray, 22 EuR. H.R. REP. at 74 (Walsh, J., dissenting).
153. Jackson, Silence and Proof,supra note 9, at 164.
154. Id. at 165.
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compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt. 15 5
Principle 21 of the Body of Principlesfor the Protection of All Persons
under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment states: "It shall be prohibited

to take undue advantage of the situation of a detained or imprisoned person for the purpose of compelling him to confess, to incriminate himself
otherwise or to testify against any other person."156
While the ECHR provides no explicit provision, the Court has generally accepted that the right to remain silent and the right against selfincrimination are "generally recognized international standards which lie
at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under Article 6," and applies
to all types of criminal proceedings. 15 7 In Funke v. France, an applicant
158
refused to disclose incriminating documents to customs authorities.
The applicant stated his right to withhold these documents was protected
under Article 6, as the right against self-incrimination was guaranteed
under fair trial provisions.t 59 The Court concurred. 160 It held: "The special features of customs law cannot justify such an infringement of the
right of anyone 'charged with a criminal offence,' within the autonomous
meaning of this expression in Article 6, to remain silent and not to contrib16 1
ute to incriminating itself.'

In Saunders v. United Kingdom-a corporate case involving an illegal
trading and share operation-an applicant to the ECHR had been legally
compelled, under the threat of penalty, to make incriminating statements
to the Department of Trade and Industry (the "DTI') Inspectors.' 6 2 These
statements were, in turn, used against him in subsequent criminal proceedings.16 3 The applicant was charged with a number of offences relating to
this operation, and he was tried and convicted on twelve counts of conspiracy, false accounting and theft, and sentenced to five years imprisonment.' 6 4 A substantial part of the prosecution's case was based on the
statements Mr. Saunders gave to the DTI Inspectors. 16 5 These statements
were later entered into evidence.' 66 The applicant in this case petitioned
67
the Court stating that his Article 6 right to a fair trial had been violated.'
68
The Commission concurred with the applicant.'
155. ICCPR, supra note 3,art. 14. 3 (g).
156. Body of Principlesfor the Protectionof All Persons under Any Form of Detention or
Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. GAOR, 76th plen. mtg., at Principle 21, U.N. Doc.
A43/173 (1988).
157. Saunders v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313, 337 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1996)
(Judgment, para. 68); Murray, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 60.
158. See 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 297, 299-300 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1993).
159. Id. at 324.
160. Id. at 326.
161. Id.
162. See Saunders, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 318-19.
163. Id. at 320.
164. Id. at 321.
165. Id. at 320-21.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 326.
168. Id. at 331.
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In the instant case, the incriminating material, which the applicant was compelled to provide, furnished a not insignificant part of the evidence against
him at trial, since it contained admissions which must have exerted additional pressure on him to take to the witness stand. The use of this evidence
was therefore oppressive and substantially impaired Mr. Saunders' ability to
defend himself169against the criminal charges he faced, thereby depriving him
of a fair trial.
In its review of the case, the Court stated:
The right not to incriminate oneself, in particular, presupposes that the
prosecution in a criminal case seek to prove their case against the accused
without resort to evidence obtained through methods of coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused. In this sense the right is closely
linked to the presumption of innocence contained in Article 6(2) of the
Convention.
however, with
The right not to incriminate oneself is primarily concerned,
170
respecting the will of an accused person to remain silent.
In finding for the applicant, the Court stated the prosecution made "extensive use" of statements in a way "which sought to incriminate the applicant .... Accordingly, there has been an infringement in the present case
71
of the [applicant's] right not to incriminate [him]self."'
The cases discussed above deal with different levels of compulsion. In
one case refusal to provide information resulted in imprisonment, while in
Murray, the result was the inference of guilt from silence. It follows, that in
regard to compulsion, as outlined in Saunders and Funke, the rights to
remain silent and against self-incrimination have merit. According to this
argument, the 'right' to silence is not blanket, and there are indeed significant differences in pre-trial and trial stages.
[Tihere is still an enormous difference between the criminal trial itself
where it may be considered reasonable to draw inferences from an accused's
failure to testify once a prima facie case has been proved against him or her
and the pre-trial police interview where there is no impartial adjudicator and
the police to disclose the details of the evidence
there is no requirement on 172
they have against suspects.
Therefore, during the trial stage, the question should be not whether
adverse inferences should be allowed to be drawn from silence but rather
what degree and weight should silence be given.
The merits of this argument are clear, and the dangers equally compelling. It is true that during the pre-trial stage the dangers of fair trial violations are greatest in the presence of coercive methods of interrogation.
Nonetheless, the danger that silence may be given undue weight and consideration during the trial stage remains. As the Commission accurately
observed, a jury (and indeed a judge) are already likely, even without
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 336 (summarizing the findings of the Commission).
Id. at 337.
Id. at 339-40.
Jackson, Silence and Proof, supra note 9, at 150.
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instruction, to factor a defendant's use of silence when deliberating.' 73
That said, allowing further instruction directing a jury or judge (under
Diplock) to weigh such silence in determining guilt does, in effect, shift the
burden of proof. As previously noted with the Casement Case, the judiciary has demonstrated that it will convict on the basis of a prima facie case
coupled with the accused's silence.
Conclusion
Examination of the history and substance of U.K. case law, as well as relevant international human rights instruments, lends weight to the argument
that the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order 1988 undermines
fair trial principles and is, therefore, incompatible with several international human rights treaties to which the United Kingdom is a signatory.
Under the Terrorism Act 2000 statements, even those that are involuntary in nature, can be admitted as evidence unless the defense can produce
primafacie evidence which shows that the statement was obtained by torture, inhumane or degrading treatment, or by using or threatening violence. 1 74 This standard suggests, as noted by the UN Special Rapporteur
on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, "that physical deprivation or
psychological pressure short of outright violence is permissible.'

75

As

was compellingly argued by the Supreme Court in Miranda:
Again we stress that the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented. As we have stated before, 'Since
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, this Court has recognized that coercion
can be mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not

the only hallmark of an unconstitutional inquisition.' Blackburn v. Alabama,
361 U.S. 199, 206 (1960). Interrogation still takes place in privacy. Privacy
results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our knowledge as to
what in fact goes on in the interrogation rooms. 176

Measures afforded by the anti-terrorism legislation taken together with curtailment of the right to silence by the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order are in contradistinction to international fair trial provisions,
which prohibit the use of compulsion to obtain evidence from an accused.
The power to draw negative or adverse inference from silence is a form of
compulsion as it "exert[s] undue influence upon a detainee to compel a
confession of guilt,"' 7 7 or to provide evidence which then may be used to
incriminate. It follows that these practices impact the Article 6 fair trial
provisions of the ECHR and are "a violation of the principle of right to
173. See ROYAL COMMISSION, supra, note 7, at 90-91, para. 4.64-4.66.
174. See Terrorism Act 2000, supra note 33, § 7, para. 76(3)(b).
175. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers,
Mr. Param Cumaraswamy, Submitted Pursuantto Commission on Human Rights Resolution
1997/23. Addendum: Report on the Mission of the Special Rapporteur to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Economic and Social Council Commission on
Human Rights, 54th Sess., Agenda Item 8, para. 82, U.N. Doc. E/Cn.4/1998/39/Add.4
Ihereinafter CUMARASWAMY].
176. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448.
177. See CUMARASWAMY, supra note 175, para. 79.
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silence set forth in Article 14 of the ICCPR."'
The erosion of the right to silence is just one casualty in the 'war on
terrorism.' The use of political violence against the State has been a staple
in Northern Ireland since the political unit was created, and has left, "emergency [to constitute] the virtual norm with normalcy forming a mere
(somewhat theoretical) exception."1 79 This paradigmatic shift is evident in
the temporary permanence of current emergency legislation operating in
the United Kingdom. Whilst the shift may simply reflect the realities of
entrenched emergencies (as has existed in Northern Ireland), a review of
the repressive measures invoked to combat the 'terrorist' threat suggest that
whilst human rights protections have been impacted, indeed eroded, the
benefits of these extraordinary measures are far from certain.1 80 What is
clear is that whilst there must be recognition and accommodation for
states facing periods of emergency, "this accommodation ought to take
place within the confines of legality," with parameters that balance "state
security with the demands of individual freedoms, liberties, and rights." 18 1
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